Authors: Gautam Panchal, Partner, and Dishita Shah, Senior Associate

In a recent order dated 21st September, 2026, the Supreme Court, in I.S.D.S. Private Limited & Anr. v. M/s Khemka Food Products Pvt. Ltd. & Anr., 2026  (“Order”), referred to a Larger Bench the question whether a Civil Judge (Senior Division) notified as a Commercial Court under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (“CCA”) can entertain a suit for infringement of a trademark, notwithstanding Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (“TM Act”), which expressly prohibits the institution of such suits in any court inferior to a District Court.

Notably, the Bench comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K. Vinod Chandran noticed an apparent conflict between two earlier decisions of the Supreme Court on the interplay between a special enactment and the CCA, and observed that the question of jurisdiction ought to be settled uniformly throughout the States rather than being left to notifications issued by different High Courts.

Background

Section 134 of the TM Act provides that a suit for infringement of a registered trademark, or relating to certain other specified reliefs, shall not be instituted in any court inferior to a District Court.

The Jharkhand High Court, in exercise of powers under the CCA, had issued a notification designating a Civil Judge (Senior Division) as a Commercial Court. The effect of the notification was to enable that court to hear a trademark infringement suit, notwithstanding the bar contained in Section 134 of the TM Act.

A commercial suit was pending before the Civil Judge (Senior Division) so notified. The appellants challenged the jurisdiction of that court to entertain the suit, relying upon Section 134 of the TM Act.

Issues

Whether a High Court notification under the CCA can enable a court inferior to a District Court to entertain a trademark infringement suit

The question before the Court was whether a notification issued by a High Court under the CCA could enable a Civil Judge (Senior Division), despite being hierarchically below a District Court, to entertain a trademark infringement suit in the face of the express bar under Section 134 of the TM Act.

Conflict between Kandla Export and Jaycee Housing

In considering the question, the Court noted an apparent conflict between its earlier decisions in Kandla Export Corporation & Anr. v. OCI Corporation & Anr. (2018) and Jaycee Housing Private Limited & Ors. v. Registrar (General), Orissa High Court (2022), both of which dealt with the relationship between the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”) and the CCA.

In Kandla Export, the Court had found the Arbitration Act to be a code unto itself and, vis-à-vis the CCA, a special legislation, with the CCA being the general legislation. On that basis, the specific appellate mechanism under the Arbitration Act was held to prevail.

In Jaycee Housing, on the other hand, the Court had categorically held that Sections 9, 14 and 34 of the Arbitration Act must, insofar as jurisdiction is concerned, concede to the CCA, finding the CCA to be a special enactment in the same manner as the Arbitration Act.

The question in the present case, namely whether the forum for a trademark infringement suit is governed by Section 134 of the TM Act or by the jurisdictional scheme of the CCA as operationalized through the High Court’s notification, would therefore depend on which of these two approaches is applied.

Uniformity of jurisdiction across States

The Court was of the opinion that the matter was required to be referred to a Larger Bench not only for resolving the conflict, but also for settling the law so that it is uniform throughout the States and the jurisdiction is “not to be left to the different notifications issued in the various States.” The Court further observed that, in its view, “the legislative imprimatur cannot be diluted by the notifications issued by the High Courts.”

For the reasons recorded in the Order, the Court directed that the matter be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders.

Comments

The Order does not decide the question of jurisdiction. It is a reference, and the position will ultimately be settled by the Larger Bench. The Court’s observation that the legislative imprimatur cannot be diluted by High Court notifications must therefore be understood as a view expressed in the context of making the reference, and not as a final determination of the issue.

Until the reference is decided, trademark infringement suits instituted before a Civil Judge (Senior Division) notified as a Commercial Court may be exposed to jurisdictional objections founded on Section 134 of the TM Act. Parties instituting fresh suits in States where such notifications have been issued may wish to take this uncertainty into account when selecting the forum, particularly where a Commercial Court at the level of a District Court is available.

The Order is also significant in that it carries the debate between Kandla Export and Jaycee Housing, which arose in the context of the Arbitration Act, into the field of trademark litigation. The decision of the Larger Bench may therefore have a bearing on how the CCA is to be read alongside other special enactments that prescribe the forum for disputes arising under them.